⒈ Philosophical Control In North Korea

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Philosophical Control In North Korea

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Moon Jae-in, a pet lover and dog owner , says he's contemplating banning the controversial practice because of declining consumption in the country. The dramatic drop in consumption in South Korea, particularly among younger generations, may mean a ban isn't needed. That said, declining consumption isn't the same as little or no consumption. South Korea is one of many countries with a history of eating dogs. Based on translated documents, Wikipedia notes that butchers, considered the "lowest class of society" in South Korea during a roughly year period ending in the early s, helped combat a "feral dog problem" by turning said dogs into food.

Anthony Podberscek notes that historically dogs were divided in parts of Asia, including Korea, into three groups: "hunting dogs, watchdogs, and food. As National Geographic reported during the Winter Olympics—which took place in Pyeongchang, South Korea—the government attempted to pay off several area restaurants that serve dog meat, asking them to halt the practice during the games. They found no takers. That same report noted that while Asian countries are often singled out for eating dog meat, history shows those countries have plenty of company outside Asia. More recently, Norwegian polar explorer Roald Amundsen, faced with a choice to starve or eat some of his sled dogs, survived to inform the public he found the dogs' meat to be "delicious.

The tide in South Korea, meanwhile, has been turning against eating dogs for decades. Seoul's most popular dog-meat restaurant closed in , Quartz reported , due to falling demand. Many of those young customers, Quartz noted, would rather own dogs as pets than eat them. Animal rights groups, some based in Korea, have campaigned against dog meat for years, and have had some successes. Still, it's unclear just how much support there is for a ban. Podberscek found in his study that most South Koreans opposed banning dog meat.

The move away from eating dogs and toward raising them as pets could also be a way to further distinguish South Korea's fundamental differences from its authoritarian neighbor to the north. Just last year, reports indicated people in North Korea were being forced to give up pet dogs in order to meet demand at local restaurants. Years ago, in an appearance on libertarian Bob Zadek 's radio program, a caller asked me to explain my position on whether or not eating dogs should be legal.

I stammered through a response, noting it was a "third rail" issue and a "libertarian purity test," offering a few ums and hmms and errrrrs , and settling on this: "If I would ever be okay with a law that would bar [eating a food], I would be okay with that. This time, without hemming and hawing: that's my position. I am okay with that. On certain theories of personal identity generally motivated by thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum transplants , each of us is not a biological organism but rather an embodied mind or a person in John Locke 's sense that comes into existence when the brain gives rise to certain developed psychological capacities.

The success of Marquis's argument thus depends on one's favored account of personal identity. The interests objection claims that what makes murder wrong is not just the deprivation of a valuable future, but the deprivation of a future that one has an interest in. The embryo has no conscious interest in its future, and so the objection concludes to kill it is not wrong. The defender of Marquis-style arguments may, however, give the counterexample of the suicidal teenager who takes no interest in his or her future, but killing whom is nonetheless wrong and murder. The equality objection claims that Marquis's argument leads to unacceptable inequalities.

But as this is strongly counterintuitive most people believe all killings are equally wrong, other things being equal , Marquis's argument must be mistaken. Some writers have concluded that the wrongness of killing arises not from the harm it causes the victim since this varies greatly among killings , but from the killing's violation of the intrinsic worth or personhood of the victim. The psychological connectedness objection claims that a being can be seriously harmed by being deprived of a valuable future only if there are sufficient psychological connections—sufficient correlations or continuations of memory, belief, desire and the like—between the being as it is now and the being as it will be when it lives out the valuable future.

A defence of this objection is likely to rest, as with certain views of personal identity , on thought experiments involving brain or cerebrum swaps; and this may render it implausible to some readers. In her well-known article " A Defense of Abortion ", Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that abortion is in some circumstances permissible even if the embryo is a person and has a right to life, because the embryo's right to life is overtrumped by the woman's right to control her body and its life-support functions. Her central argument involves a thought experiment. Thomson asks us to imagine that an individual call Bob wakes up in bed next to a famous violinist. He is unconscious with a fatal kidney ailment; and because only Bob happens to have the right blood type to help, the Society of Music Lovers has kidnapped Bob and plugged his circulatory system into the violinist's so that Bob's kidneys can filter poisons from his blood as well as his own.

If the violinist is disconnected from Bob now, he will die; but in nine months he will recover and can be safely disconnected. Thomson takes it that one may permissibly unplug oneself from the violinist even though this will kill him. The right to life, Thomson says, does not entail the right to use another person's body, and so in disconnecting the violinist one does not violate his right to life but merely deprives him of something—the use of another person's body—to which he has no right. Similarly, even if the fetus has a right to life, it does not have a right to use the pregnant woman's body and life-support functions against her will; and so aborting the pregnancy is permissible in at least some circumstances. However, Thomson notes that the woman's right to abortion does not include the right to directly insist upon the death of the child, should the fetus happen to be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside the womb.

Critics of this argument generally agree that unplugging the violinist is permissible, but claim there are morally relevant disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. The most common objection is that the violinist scenario, involving a kidnapping , is analogous only to abortion after rape. In most cases of abortion, the pregnant woman was not raped but had intercourse voluntarily, and thus has either tacitly consented to allowing the embryo to use her body the tacit consent objection [46] , or else has a duty to sustain the embryo because the woman herself caused it to stand in need of her body the responsibility objection [47].

Other common objections turn on the claim that the embryo is the pregnant woman's child whereas the violinist is a stranger the stranger versus offspring objection [48] ; that abortion kills the embryo whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die the killing versus letting die objection [48] ; or, similarly, that abortion intentionally causes the embryo's death whereas unplugging the violinist merely causes death as a foreseen but unintended side-effect the intending versus foreseeing objection; [49] cf the doctrine of double effect. Defenders of Thomson's argument—most notably David Boonin [50] —reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not hold, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but do not apply to abortion in the way that critics have claimed.

Critics have in turn responded to Boonin's arguments. Alternative scenarios have been put forth as more accurate and realistic representations of the moral issues present in abortion. John Noonan proposes the scenario of a family who was found to be liable for frostbite finger loss suffered by a dinner guest whom they refused to allow to stay overnight, although it was very cold outside and the guest showed signs of being sick. It is argued that just as it would not be permissible to refuse temporary accommodation for the guest to protect them from physical harm, it would not be permissible to refuse temporary accommodation of a fetus. Other critics claim that there is a difference between artificial and extraordinary means of preservation, such as medical treatment, kidney dialysis, and blood transfusions, and normal and natural means of preservation, such as gestation, childbirth, and breastfeeding.

They argue that if a baby was born into an environment in which there was no replacement available for her mother's breast milk, and the baby would either breastfeed or starve, the mother would have to allow the baby to breastfeed. But the mother would never have to give the baby a blood transfusion, no matter what the circumstances were. The difference between breastfeeding in that scenario and blood transfusions is the difference between gestation and childbirth on the one hand, and using one's body as a kidney dialysis machine on the other.

One argument against the right to abortion appeals to the secular value of a human life. The thought is that all forms of human life, including the fetus, are inherently valuable because they are connected to our thoughts on family and parenthood, among other natural aspects of humanity. Thus, abortion can express the wrong attitudes towards humanity in a way that manifest vicious character. This view is represented by some forms of Humanism and by moral philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse in her widely anthologized article "Virtue Theory and Abortion". For example, she says, "Love and friendship do not survive their parties' constantly insisting on their rights, nor do people live well when they think that getting what they have a right to is of preeminent importance; they harm others, and they harm themselves.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Philosophy related to support or opposition to abortion. Further information: Beginning of human personhood. See also: Artificial womb. See also: Virtue ethics. The Journal of Value Inquiry. PMID S2CID The same point is made in Tooley ; Singer and ; Pojman ; and elsewhere. Note that "person" can also be used in two senses. In John Locke 's sense often employed in discussions of personal identity , "person" is a descriptive term that tells us about a being's psychological properties.

In Warren's sense, "person" is a moral or evaluative term that tells us about a being's moral properties. Warren and others hold, however, that being a person in the moral sense actually requires being a person in the psychological sense. Glover and English also refer to a 'cluster' of properties as constituting personhood. Gareth Journal of Medical Ethics. JSTOR PMC Note that on Marquis's view see below , by contrast, one could fail to have a right to life—for example by becoming irreversibly comatose , since one's future would then lack valuable experiences and activities. Retrieved For a similar argument published earlier , see Stone and The type of wrongness appealed to here is presumptive or prima facie wrongness: as noted below, it may be overridden in exceptional circumstances.

Although Marquis views the killing of an embryo or normal human adult as seriously wrong, he avoids any reference to " rights " or the "right to life", and so is apparently not committed to deontological ethics. Supporters of the personhood view include Warren 18; McInerney though there is some ambiguity ; Doepke ch 9; and Baker Archived from the original PDF on Abortion-rights movements Anti-abortion movements. Abortion and mental health Beginning of human personhood Beginning of pregnancy controversy Abortion-breast cancer hypothesis Anti-abortion violence Abortion under communism Birth control Crisis pregnancy center Ethical aspects of abortion Eugenics Fetal rights Forced abortion Genetics and abortion Late-term abortion Legalized abortion and crime effect Libertarian perspectives on abortion Limit of viability Malthusianism Men's rights Minors and abortion Natalism One-child policy Paternal rights and abortion Post-abortion care Prenatal development Reproductive rights Self-induced abortion Sex-selective abortion Sidewalk counseling Societal attitudes towards abortion Socialism Toxic abortion Unsafe abortion Women's rights.

Case law Constitutional law History of abortion law Laws by country Buffer zones Conscientious objection Fetal protection Heartbeat bills Informed consent Late-term restrictions Parental involvement Spousal consent. Authority control: National libraries United States. Categories : Abortion debate Philosophical arguments.

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