✎✎✎ Similarities Between Transcendentalism And The Second Great Awakening

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Similarities Between Transcendentalism And The Second Great Awakening



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19th Century Reforms: Crash Course US History #15

English Unitarianism produced some well-known scholars, e. John Kenrick — , James Yates — , Samuel Sharpe — , but few popular preachers, though George Harris — is an exception. It also produced the notable Chamberlain family of politicians: Joseph Chamberlain , Austen Chamberlain , and Neville Chamberlain , and the Courtauld and Tate industrialist dynasties. This came into operation in , awarded scholarships and fellowships, supported an annual lectureship — , and maintained from a chair of ecclesiastical history at Manchester College. Much has been made of the execution at Edinburgh of the student Thomas Aikenhead , convicted of blaspheming the Trinity.

The works of John Taylor , D. Overt Unitarianism has never had much vogue in Scotland. The only congregation of old foundation is at Edinburgh, founded in by a secession from one of the "fellowship societies" formed by James Fraser, of Brea — The mission enterprises of Richard Wright — and George Harris — produced results of no great permanence. The McQuaker Trust was founded for propagandist purposes. Paradoxically, one of the reasons for the relative weakness of Unitarian movement in Scotland in the early 19th century may be the continuing presence of conservative, and therefore Bible-fundamentalist, non-Trinitarian, Arian, and Socinian views in dissenting chapels and among the Scottish followers of the Restoration Movement and Millerite movement.

The Non-Trinitarian believers in Scotland were often more sympathetic to the Unitarians of a century earlier than to the more liberal views of Wright, Harris and Southwood Smith. A notable Bible-fundamentalist Scottish Unitarian was J. Hyndman, author of Lectures on The Principles of Unitarianism Alnwick , [13] This conservative non-Trinitarian presence can be demonstrated by the response in Scotland, relative both to America and to his home town London, of the call of the first Christadelphian John Thomas. The first congregations following Thomas' Socinian and Adventist teachings in were predominantly Scottish. Controversy respecting the Trinity was excited in Ireland by the prosecution at Dublin of Thomas Emlyn see above , resulting in fine and imprisonment, for rejecting the deity of Christ.

In the Belfast Society was founded for theological discussion by Presbyterian ministers in the north, with the result of creating a body of opinion adverse to subscription to the Westminster standards. Toleration of dissent, withheld in Ireland till , was then granted without the requirement of any doctrinal subscription. Next year a movement against subscription was begun in the General Synod of Ulster , culminating in the placing of the advocates of non-subscription, headed by John Abernethy , D. This Presbytery of Antrim was excluded from jurisdiction, though not from communion. During the next hundred years its members exercised great influence on their brethren of the synod; but the counter-influence of the mission of the Scottish Seceders from produced a reaction.

The Antrim Presbytery gradually became Arian; the same type of theology affected more or less the Southern Association, known since as the Synod of Munster. From ten of the fourteen presbyteries in the Synod of Ulster had made subscription optional; the synod's code of left "soundness in the faith" to be ascertained by subscription or by examination. Against this compromise Henry Cooke , D.

Montgomery led a secession which formed the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster , comprising three presbyteries. Till they maintained two theological chairs in Belfast, where John Scott Porter — pioneered biblical criticism; they afterwards sent their students to England for their theological education, though in certain respects their views and practices remained more conservative than those of their English brethren. Unitarianism in the United States followed essentially the same development as in England, and passed through the stages of Arminianism , Arianism , to rationalism and a modernism based on an acceptance of the results of the comparative study of all religions.

In the early 18th century Arminianism presented itself in New England , and sporadically elsewhere. This tendency was largely accelerated by a backlash against the " Great Awakening " under Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield. Before the War of Independence Arianism showed itself in individual instances, and French influences were widespread in the direction of deism, though they were not organized into any definite utterance by religious bodies. As early as the middle of the 18th century Harvard College represented the most advanced thought of the time, [ citation needed ] and a score or more of clergymen in New England preached what was essentially Unitarianism.

The most prominent of these men was Jonathan Mayhew — , pastor of the West Church in Boston , Massachusetts, from to He preached the strict unity of God, the subordinate nature of Christ, and salvation by character. Charles Chauncy — , pastor of the First Church from until his death, the chief opponent of Edwards in the great revival, was both a Unitarian and a Universalist. The first official acceptance of the Unitarian faith on the part of a congregation was by King's Chapel in Boston, which settled James Freeman — in , and revised the Prayer Book into a mild Unitarian liturgy in The Rev. William Hazlitt father of the essayist and critic , visiting the United States in —, published the fact that there were Unitarians in Philadelphia , Boston, Charleston , Pittsburgh , Hallowell , on Cape Cod , and elsewhere.

Unitarian congregations were organized at Portland and Saco in by Thomas Oxnard ; in the First Church in Plymouth —the congregation founded by the Pilgrims in —accepted the more liberal faith. Joseph Priestley emigrated to the United States in , and organized a Unitarian Church at Northumberland, Pennsylvania , the same year and one at Philadelphia in His writings had a considerable influence.

Thus from to , Unitarianism was gaining ground in New England, and to some extent elsewhere. The first distinctive manifestation of the change was the inauguration of Henry Ware — as professor of divinity at Harvard College, in In the same year appeared Unitarian books by John Sherman — and another in by Noah Worcester — At the opening of the 19th century, with one exception, all the churches of Boston were occupied by Unitarian preachers, and various periodicals and organizations expressed their opinions. The next period of American Unitarianism, from about to about , can be thought of as formative, mainly influenced by English philosophy, semi-supernatural, imperfectly rationalistic, devoted to philanthropy and practical Christianity.

Channing was its distinguished exponent. The first official acceptance of the Unitarian faith on the part of a congregation in America was by King's Chapel in Boston, which took James Freeman — as its pastor in , and revised the Prayer Book into a mild Unitarian liturgy in In , Joseph Stevens Buckminster became minister of the Brattle Street Church in Boston, where his brilliant sermons, literary activities, and academic attention to the German "New Criticism" helped shape the subsequent growth of Unitarianism in New England.

Unitarian Henry Ware — was appointed as the Hollis professor of divinity at Harvard College, in Harvard Divinity school then shifted from its conservative roots to teach Unitarian theology. At first mystical rather than rationalistic in his theology, he took part with the "Catholic Christians", as they called themselves, who aimed at bringing Christianity into harmony with the progressive spirit of the time. His sermon on "Unitarian Christianity", preached at First Unitarian Church of Baltimore in , at the ordination of Jared Sparks , and that at New York in , made him its interpreter.

The result of the "Unitarian Controversy" [21] [22] was a growing division in the Congregational churches, which was emphasized in by the formation of the American Unitarian Association at Boston. It was organized "to diffuse the knowledge and promote the interests of pure Christianity" and it published tracts and books, supported poor churches, sent out missionaries into every part of the country, and established new churches in nearly all the states. Essentially non-sectarian, with little missionary zeal, the Unitarian movement has grown slowly, and its influence had chiefly operated through general culture and the literature of the country. Many of its clergymen had been trained in other denominations, but the Harvard Divinity School was distinctly Unitarian from its formation, in , until , when it became a non-sectarian department of the university.

A third period see Transcendentalism , from about to about , profoundly influenced by German idealism , was increasingly rationalistic, though its theology was largely flavoured by mysticism. The more rationalistic minority thereupon formed the Free Religious Association , "to encourage the scientific study of theology and to increase fellowship in the spirit.

This period of controversy and of vigorous theological development practically came to an end soon after Its cessation was assured by the action of the national conference at Saratoga, New York in , when it was affirmed by a nearly unanimous vote that: "These churches accept the religion of Jesus, holding, in accordance with his teaching, that practical religion is summed up in love to God and love to man. The conference recognizes the fact that its constituency is Congregational in tradition and polity. Therefore it declares that nothing in this constitution is to be construed as an authoritative test; and we cordially invite to our working fellowship any who, while differing from us in belief, are in general sympathy with our spirit and our practical aims.

The fourth period, beginning about , has been one of rationalism , recognition of universal religion, large acceptance of the scientific method and ideas and an ethical attempt to realize what was perceived as to be the higher affirmations of Christianity. It has been marked by a general harmony and unity, by steady growth in the number of churches and by a widening fellowship with all other similarly minded movements. This phase was shown in the organization of The International Council of Unitarian and other Liberal Religious Thinkers and Workers at Boston on 25 May , "to open communication with those in all lands who are striving to unite pure religion and perfect liberty, and to increase fellowship and co-operation among them.

During the period after the influence of Emerson became predominant, modified by the more scientific preaching of Minot Judson Savage , who found his guides in Darwin and Spencer. Beyond its own borders the body obtained recognition through the public work of such men as Henry Whitney Bellows and Edward Everett Hale , the remarkable influence of James Freeman Clarke and Thomas Lamb Eliot , and the popular power of Robert Collyer. The number of Unitarian churches in the United States in was , with ministers. The church membership then, really nominal, may be estimated at , Strictly speaking, modern-day Unitarian Universalism is not Unitarian in theology.

Despite its name, this denomination does not necessarily promote either belief in One God or universal salvation. It is merely the inheritor of the Unitarian and Universalist church system in America. Though there are Unitarians within the UUA, there is no creed or doctrine that one must affirm to join a Unitarian Universalist congregation. This makes it very different from many other faith groups.

Today, the majority of Unitarian Universalists do not identify themselves as Christians. Unitarian Universalists base their community on a set of Principles and Purposes rather than on a prophet or creed. Congressman Pete Stark , former U. Senator Mike Gravel and Christopher Reeve. The decline of specifically Christian theology in the Unitarian churches in the United States has prompted several revival movements. The AUC's mission is "renewal of the historic Unitarian faith", and promotes a set of God-centered religious principles, but like Unitarian Universalism, it does not impose a creed on its members.

Unitarians in America, because of the developments with the Unitarian churches, have generally taken one of three courses of action to find communities in which to worship God. Some have stayed within the Unitarian churches, accepting the non-Christian nature of their congregation, but have found their needs met in the UUCF. Some Unitarians, because they felt that the mainstream UUA churches are not accepting of Christians, or that the larger Unitarian Universalist organizations are becoming too political and liberal to be considered a religious movement or faith, have decided to affiliate with the American Unitarian Conference.

Most Christian Unitarians have sought out liberal Christian churches in other denominations and have made homes there. Unitarianism arrived in Canada from Iceland and Britain. Some Canadian congregations had services in Icelandic into living memory. The first Unitarian service in Canada was held in by a minister from England, Rev, David Hughes, in a school owned by the Workman family, who were Unitarians from Belfast. The Montreal congregation, founded in , called their first permanent minister, the Rev. John Cordner, of the Remonstrant Synod of Ulster ; he arrived in and served as their minister for thirty-six years.

Then in , a congregation in Toronto was founded whose first minister, William Adam, was a Scottish Baptist missionary who had served in India. Then other congregations formed, Hamilton in , Ottawa in , the First Icelandic Unitarian Church in Winnipeg in , a congregation in Vancouver in and a congregation in Victoria in Individual Canadian congregations had ties to the British association until they were disrupted by World War II, when relations to Unitarians in the United States became stronger. Universalism found its way to Canada during the 19th century, for the most part, though not entirely, brought by settlers from the United States. Universalist congregations formed, with the exception of the congregation in Halifax in , mostly in rural towns and villages in lower Quebec and the Maritimes, and in southern Ontario.

The CUC was formed on 14 May , one day before the UUA in the United States, but the two functioned in close association until money exchange and other complications led to greater independence, with the CUC in assuming the direct delivery of services to Canadian congregations which was formerly delivered by the UUA. Lotta Hitschmanova and initially supported largely by Unitarians, now continues as a separate agency called USC Canada which draws support throughout Canada for its humanitarian work in many parts of the world. Brian Kiely, who was to give the ordination sermon, was told partly in jest he must define Canadian Unitarianism, as Rev. Channing had at that New England ordination sermon of The simile Rev.

Their visions of the origins of class and political societies were instead the culmination of an earlier, richly articulated development of society into hierarchical forms. The divisions within organic society increasingly raised the old to supremacy over the young, men to supremacy over women, the shaman and later the priestly corporation to supremacy over lay society, one class to supremacy over another, and State formations to supremacy over society in general. For the reader imbued with the conventional wisdom of our era, I cannot emphasize too strongly that society in the form of bands, families, clans, tribes, tribal federations, villages, and even municipalities long antedates State formations.

The State, with its specialized functionaries, bureaucracies, and armies, emerges quite late in human social development — often well beyond the threshold of history. It remained in sharp conflict with coexisting social structures such as guilds, neighborhoods, popular societies, cooperatives, town meetings, and a wide variety of municipal assemblies. But the hierarchical organization of all differentia did not end with the structuring of "civil" society into an institutionalized system of obedience and command. In time, hierarchy began to invade less tangible fields of life. Mental activity was given supremacy over physical work, intellectual experience over sensuousness, the "reality principle" over the "pleasure principle," and finally judgment, morality, and spirit were pervaded by an ineffable authoritarianism that was to take its vengeful command over language and the most rudimentary forms of symbolization.

The vision of social and natural diversity was altered from an organic sensibility that sees different phenomena as unity in diversity into a hierarchical mentality that ranked the most miniscule phenomena into mutually antagonistic pyramids erected around notions of "inferior" and "superior. Thus, the effort to restore the ecological principle of unity in diversity has become a social effort in its own right — a revolutionary effort that must rearrange sensibility in order to rearrange the real world.

A hierarchical mentality fosters the renunciation of the pleasures of life. It justifies toil, guilt, and sacrifice by the "inferiors," and pleasure and the indulgent gratification of virtually every caprice by their "superiors. Heinous as my view may be to modern Freudians, it is not the discipline of work but the discipline of rule that demands the repression of internal nature.

This repression then extends outward to external nature as a mere object of rule and later of exploitation. This mentality permeates our individual psyches in a cumulative form up to the present day — not merely as capitalism but as the vast history of hierarchical society from its inception. Unless we explore this history, which lives actively within us like earlier phases of our individual lives, we will never be free of its hold.

We may eliminate social injustice, but we will not achieve social freedom. We may eliminate classes and exploitation, but we will not be spared from the trammels of hierarchy and domination. We may exorcize the spirit of gain and accumulation from our psyches, but we will still be burdened by gnawing guilt, renunciation, and a subtle belief in the "vices" of sensuousness. Another series of distinctions appears in this book — the distinction between morality and ethics and between justice and freedom, Morality — as I use this term — denotes conscious standards of behavior that have not yet been subjected to thorough rational analyses by a community. I have eschewed the use of the word "custom" as a substitute for the word morality because moral criteria for judging behavior do involve some kind of explanation and cannot be reduced to the conditioned social reflexes we usually call custom.

The Mosaic commandments, like those of other world religions, for example, were justified on theological grounds; they were the sacrosanct words of Yahweh, which we might reasonably challenge today because they are not grounded in reason. Ethics, by contrast, invites rational analyses and, like Kant's "moral imperative," must be justified by intellectual operations, not mere faith.

Hence, morality lies somewhere between unthinking custom and rational ethical criteria of right and wrong. Without making these distinctions, it would be difficult to explain the increasingly ethical claims the State has made on its citizens, particularly in eroding the archaic moral codes that supported the patriarch's complete control over his family, and the impediments this authority has placed in the way of politically more expansive societies like the Athenian polis. The distinction between justice and freedom, between formal equality and substantive equality, is even more basic and continually recurs throughout the book. This distinction has rarely been explored even by radical theorists, who often still echo the historical cry of the oppressed for "Justice!

Worse yet, the two have been used as equivalents which they decidedly are not. The young Proudhon and later Marx correctly perceived that true freedom presupposes an equality based on a recognition of inequality — the inequality of capacities and needs, of abilities and responsibilities. Mere formal equality, which "justly" rewards each according to his or her contribution to society and sees everyone as "equal in the eyes of the law" and "equal in opportunity," grossly obscures the fact that the young and old, the weak and infirm, the individual with few responsibilities and the one with many not to speak of the rich and the poor in contemporary society by no means enjoy genuine equality in a society guided by the rule of equivalence.

Indeed, terms like rewards, needs, opportunity, or, for that matter, property — however communally "owned" or collectively operated — require as much investigation as the word law. Unfortunately, the revolutionary tradition did not fully develop these themes and their embodiment in certain terms. Socialism, in most of its forms, gradually degenerated into a demand for "economic justice," thereby merely restating the rule of equivalence as an economic emendation to the juridical and political rule of equivalence established by the bourgeoisie.

It is my purpose to thoroughly unscramble these distinctions, to demonstrate how the confusion arose in the first place and how it can be clarified so it no longer burdens the future. A third contrast that I try to develop in this book is the distinction between happiness and pleasure. Happiness, as defined here, is the mere satisfaction of need, of our survival needs for food, shelter, clothing, and material security — in short, our needs as animal organisms.

Pleasure, by contrast, is the satisfaction of our desires, of our intellectual, esthetic, sensuous and playful "daydreams. We can see evidence of this regressive development in many radical ideologies that justify toil and need at the expense of artful work and sensuous joy. That these ideologies denounce the quest for fulfillment of the sensuous as "bourgeois individualism" and "libertinism" hardly requires mention. Yet it is precisely in this utopistic quest for pleasure, I believe, that humanity begins to gain its most sparkling glimpse of emancipation.

With this quest carried to the social realm, rather than confined to a privatized hedonism, humanity begins to transcend the realm of justice, even of a classless society, and enters into the realm of freedom — a realm conceived as the full realization of humanity's potentialities in their most creative form. If I were asked to single out the one underlying contrast that permeates this book, it is the seeming conflict between the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom. It involves the "blind" world of "natural" or external nature and the rational world of "human" or internal nature that society must dominate to create the material conditions for freedom — the free time and leisure to allow man to develop his potentialities and powers.

This drama is redolent with the conflict between nature and society, woman and man, and body and reason that permeates western images of "civilization. Its apotheosis, ironically, is reached in various socialisms, particularly those of Robert, Owen, Saint-Simon, and in its most sophisticated form, Karl Marx. Marx's image of the "savage who wrestles with nature" is not an expression so much of Enlightenment hubris as it is of Victorian arrogance.

Woman, as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer observed, has no stake in this conflict. It is strictly between man and nature. From Aristotle's time to Marx's, the split is regarded as inevitable: the gap between necessity and freedom may be narrowed by technological advances that give man an ever-greater ascendancy over nature, but it can never be bridged. What puzzled a few highly sophisticated Marxists in later years was how the repression and disciplining of external nature could be achieved without repressing and disciplining internal nature: how could "natural" nature be kept in tow without subjugating "human" nature?

My attempt to unravel this puzzle involves an effort to deal with the Victorians' mythic "savage," to investigate external nature and its relationship to internal nature, to give meaning to the world of necessity nature in terms of the ability of the world of freedom society to colonize and liberate it. My strategy is to reexamine the evolution and meaning of technology in a new ecological light. I will try to ascertain how work ceased to be attractive and playful, and turned into onerous toil. Hence, I am led to a drastic reconsideration of the nature and structure of technics, of work, and of humanity's metabolism with nature. Here, I would like to emphasize that my views on nature are linked by a fairly unorthodox notion of reason. As Adorno and Horkheimer have emphasized, reason was once perceived as an immanent feature of reality, indeed, as the organizing and motivating principle of the world.

It was seen as an inherent force — as the logos — that imparted meaning and coherence to reality at all levels of existence. The modern world has abandoned this notion and reduced reason to rationalization, that is, to a mere technique for achieving practical ends. Logos, in effect, was simply turned into logic. This book tries to recover this notion of an immanent world reason, albeit without the archaic, quasi-theological trappings that render this notion untenable to a more knowledgeable and secular society. In my view, reason exists in nature as the self-organizing attributes of substance; it is the latent subjectivity in the inorganic and organic levels of reality that reveal an inherent striving toward consciousness.

In humanity, this subjectivity reveals itself as self-consciousness. I do not claim that my approach is unique; an extensive literature that supports the existence of a seemingly intrinsic logos in nature derives mainly from the scientific community itself. What I have tried to do here is to cast my speculations about reason in distinctly historical and ecological terms, free of the theological and mystical proclivities that have so often marred the formulations of a rational nature philosophy.

In the closing chapters, I try to explore the interface between nature philosophy and libertarian social theory. I am also obliged to recover the authentic utopian tradition, particularly as expressed by Rabelais, Charles Fourier, and William Morris, from amidst the debris of futurism that conceals it. Futurism, as exemplified by the works of Herman Kahn, merely extrapolates the hideous present into an even more hideous future and thereby effaces the creative, imaginative dimensions of futurity. By contrast, the utopian tradition seeks to permeate necessity with freedom, work with play, even toil with artfulness and festiveness. My contrast between utopianism and futurism forms the basis for a creative, liberatory reconstruction of an ecological society, for a sense of human mission and meaning as nature rendered self-conscious.

This book opens with a Norse myth that depicts how the gods must pay a penalty for seeking the conquest of nature. It ends with a social project for removing that penalty, whose Latin root poenalis has given us the word pain. Humanity will become the deities it created in its imagination, albeit as deities within nature, not above nature — as "supernatural" entities. The title of this book, The Ecology of Freedom, is meant to express the reconciliation of nature and human society in a new ecological sensibility and a new ecological society — a reharmonization of nature and humanity through a reharmonization of human with human.

A dialectical tension pervades this book. Throughout my discussion I often deal with potentialities that have yet to be actualized historically. Expository needs often compel me to treat a certain social condition in embryonic form as though it had already reached fulfillment. My procedure is guided by the need to bring the concept out in full relief, to clarify its complete meaning and implications. In my descriptions of the historical role of the elders in the formation of hierarchy, for example, some readers might surmise that I believe hierarchy existed at the very outset of human society.

The influential role that the elders were to play in forming hierarchies is intermingled with their more modest role at earlier periods of social development, when they actually exercised comparatively little social influence. In this situation I am faced with the need to clarify how the elders constituted the earliest "seeds" of hierarchy. A gerontocracy was probably the first form of hierarchy to exist in society. But, owing to my mode of presentation, some readers might assume that the rule of the old over the young existed during periods of human society when no such rule really existed. Nevertheless, the insecurities that come with age almost certainly existed among the elders, and they eventually used whatever means available to prevail over the young and gain their reverence.

The same expository problem arises when I deal with the shaman's role in the evolution of early hierarchies, with the male's role in relation to women, and so forth. The reader should be mindful that any "fact," firmly stated and apparently complete, is actually the result of a complex process — not a given datum that appears full-blown in a community or society. Much of the dialectical tension that pervades this book arises from the fact that I deal with processes, not with cut-and-dried propositions that comfortably succeed each other in stately fashion, like categories in a traditional logic text.

Incipient, potentially hierarchical elites gradually evolve, each phase of their evolution shading into the succeeding one, until the first firm shoots of hierarchy emerge and eventually mature. Their growth is uneven and intermixed. The elders and shamans rely on each other and then compete with each other for social privileges, many of which are attempts to achieve the personal security conferred by a certain measure of influence.

Both groups enter into alliances with an emerging warrior caste of young men, finally to form the beginnings of a quasi-political community and an incipient State. Their privileges and powers only then become generalized into institutions that try to exercise command over society as a whole. At other times, however, hierarchical growth may become arrested and even "regress" to a greater parity between age and sex groups. Unless rule was achieved from outside, by conquest, the emergence of hierarchy was not a sudden revolution in human affairs.

It was often a long and complex process. Finally, I would like to emphasize that this book is structured around contrasts between preliterate, nonhierarchical societies — their outlooks, technics, and forms of thinking — and "civilizations" based on hierarchy and domination. Each of the themes touched upon in the second chapter is picked up again in the following chapters and explored in greater detail to clarify the sweeping changes "civilization" introduced in the human condition.

What we so often lack in our daily lives and our social sensibilities is a sense of the cleavages and slow gradations by which our society developed in contrast — often in brutal antagonism — to preindustrial and preliterate cultures. We live so completely immersed in our present that it absorbs all our sensibilities and hence our very capacity to think of alternate social forms. Thus, I will continually return to preliterate sensibilities, which I merely note in Chapter Two, to explore their contrasts with later institutions, technics, and forms of thinking in hierarchical societies. This book does not march to the drumbeat of logical categories, nor are its arguments marshalled into a stately parade of sharply delineated historical eras. I have not written a history of events, each of which follows the other according to the dictates of a prescribed chronology.

Anthropology, history, ideologies, even systems of philosophy and reason, inform this book — and with them, digressions and excurses that I feel throw valuable light on the great movement of natural and human development. The more impatient reader may want to leap over passages and pages that he or she finds too discursive or digressive. But this book focuses on a few general ideas that grow according to the erratic and occasionally wayward logic of the organic rather than the strictly analytic. I hope that the reader will also want to grow with this book, to experience it and understand it — critically and querulously, to be sure, but with empathy and sensibility for the living development of freedom it depicts and the dialectic it explores in humanity's conflict with domination.

Having offered my mea culpas for certain expository problems, I would like to emphatically affirm my conviction that this process-oriented dialectical approach comes much closer to the truth of hierarchical development than a presumably clearer analytical approach so favored by academic logicians. As we look back over many millenia, our thinking and analyses of the past are overly informed by a long historical development that early humanity evidently lacked. We are inclined to project into the past a vast body of social relations, political institutions, economic concepts, moral precepts, and a tremendous corpus of personal and social ideas that people living thousands.

What are fully matured actualities to us were, to them, still unformed potentialities. They thought in terms that were basically different from ours. What we now take for granted as part of the "human condition" was simply inconceivable to them. We, in turn, are virtually incapable of dealing with a vast wealth of natural phenomena that were integrally part of their lives. The very structure of our language conspires against an understanding of their outlook. Doubtless many "truths" that preliterate peoples held were patently false, a statement that is easily made nowadays. But I will make a case for the notion that their outlook, particularly as applied to their communities' relationship with the natural world, had a. I examine their ecological sensibility and try to show why and how it deteriorated.

More importantly, I am eager to determine what can be recovered from that outlook and integrated into our own. No contradiction is created by merging their ecological sensibility with our prevailing analytical one, provided such a merging transcends both sensibilities in a new way of thinking and experiencing. We can no more return to their conceptual "primitivism" than they could have grasped our analytical "sophistication.

The melding of an organic, process-oriented outlook with an analytical one has been the traditional goal of classical western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Hegel. Such a philosophy has always been more than an outlook or a mere method for dealing with reality. It has also been what the philosophers call an ontology — a description of reality conceived not as mere matter, but as active, self-organizing substance with a striving toward consciousness. Tradition has made this ontological outlook the framework in which thought and matter, subject and object, mind and nature are reconciled on a new spiritized level.

Accordingly, I regard this process-oriented view of phenomena as intrinsically ecological in character, and I am very puzzled by the failure of so many dialectically oriented thinkers to see the remarkable compatibility between a dialectical outlook and an ecological one. My vision of reality as process may also seem flawed to those readers who deny the existence of meaning and the value of humanity in natural development. That I see "progress" in organic and social evolution will doubtlessly be viewed skeptically by a generation that erroneously identifies "progress" with unlimited material growth.

I, for one, do not make this identification. Perhaps my problem, if such it can be called, is generational. I still cherish a time that sought to illuminate the course of events, to interpret them, to make them meaningful. Also, this book does not radiate the pessimism so common in environmentalist literature. Just as I believe that the past has meaning, so too do I believe that the future can have meaning. If we cannot be certain that the human estate will advance, we do have the opportunity to choose between utopistic freedom and social immolation.

Herein lies the unabashed messianic character of this book, a messianic character that is philosophical and ancestral. The "principle of hope," as Ernst Bloch called it, is part of everything I value — hence my detestation of a futurism so committed to the present that it cancels out futurity itself by denying anything new that is not an extrapolation of the existing society. I have tried to avoid writing a book that masticates every possible thought that relates to the issues raised in the following pages.

I would not want to deliver these thoughts as predigested pap to a passive reader. The dialectical tension I value the most is between the reader of a book and the writer: the hints, the suggestions, the unfinished thoughts and the stimuli that encourage the reader to think for himself or herself. In an era that is so much in flux, it would be arrogant to present finished analyses and recipes; rather, I regard it as the responsibility of a serious work to stimulate dialectical and ecological thinking.

For a work that is so "simple," so "clear," so unshared — in a word, so elitist — as to require no emendations and modifications, the reader will have to look elsewhere. This book is not an ideological program; it is a stimulus to thought — a coherent body of concepts the reader will have to finish in the privacy of his or her own mind. The legends of the Norsemen tell of a time when all beings were apportioned their worldly domains: the gods occupied a celestial domain, Asgard, and men lived on the earth, Midgard, below which lay Niffleheirn, the dark, icy domain of the giants, dwarfs, and the dead. These domains were linked together by an enormous ash, the World Tree. Its lofty branches reached into the sky, and its roots into the furthermost depths of the earth.

Although the World Tree was constantly being gnawed by animals, it remained ever green, renewed by a magic fountain that infused it continually with life. The gods, who had fashioned this world, presided over a precarious state of tranquility. They had banished their enemies, the giants, to the land of ice. Fenris the wolf was enchained, and the great serpent of the Midgard was held at bay. Despite the lurking dangers, a general peace prevailed, and plenty existed for the gods, men, and all living things.

Odin, the god of wisdom, reigned over all the deities; the wisest and strongest, he watched over the battles of men and selected the most heroic of the fallen to feast with him in his great fortress, Valhalla. Thor, the son of Odin, was not only a powerful warrior, the defender of Asgard against the restive giants, but also a deity of order, who saw to the keeping of faith between men and obedience to the treaties.

There were gods and goddesses of plenty, of fertility, of love, of law, of the sea and ships, and a multitude of animistic spirits who inhabited all things and beings of the earth. But the world order began to break down when the gods, greedy for riches, tortured the witch Gullveig, the maker of gold, to compel her to reveal her secrets. Discord now became rampant among the gods and men. The gods began to break their oaths; corruption, treachery, rivalry, and greed began to dominate the world.

With the breakdown of the primal unity, the days of the gods and men, of Asgard and Midgard, were numbered. Inexorably, the violation of the world order would lead to Ragnarok — the death of the gods in a great conflict before Valhalla. The gods would go down in a terrible battle with the giants, Fenris the wolf, and the serpent of the Midgard.

With the mutual destruction of all the combatants, humanity too would perish, and nothing would remain but bare rock and overflowing oceans in a void of cold and darkness. Having thus disintegrated into its beginnings, however, the world would be renewed, purged of its earlier evils and the corruption that destroyed it. Nor would the new world emerging from the void suffer another catastrophic end, for the second generation of gods and goddesses would learn from the mistakes of their antecedents. The prophetess who recounts the story tells us that humanity thenceforth will "live in joy for as long as one can foresee. In this Norse cosmography, there seems to be more than the old theme of "eternal recurrence," of a time-sense that spins around perpetual cycles of birth, maturation, death, and rebirth.

Rather, one is aware of prophecy infused with historical trauma; the legend belongs to a little-explored area of mythology that might be called "myths of disintegration. We do know that Christianity, with its bargain of eternal reward, came later to the Norsemen than to any other large ethnic group in western Europe, and its roots were shallow for generations afterward. The heathenism of the north had long made contact with the commerce of the south. During the Viking raids on Europe, the sacred places of the north had become polluted by gold, and the pursuit of riches was dividing kinsman from kinsman.

Hierarchies erected by valor were being eroded by systems of privilege based on wealth. The clans and tribes were breaking down; the oaths between men, from which stemmed the unity of their primordial world, were being dishonored, and the magic fountain that kept the World Tree alive was being clogged by the debris of commerce. What haunts us in such myths of disintegration are not their histories, but their prophecies. Like the Norsemen, and perhaps even more, like the people at the close of the Middle Ages, we sense that our world, too, is breaking down — institutionally, culturally, and physically.

Whether we are faced with a new, paradisical era or a catastrophe like the Norse Ragnarok is still unclear, but there can be no lengthy period of compromise between past and future in an ambiguous present. The reconstructive and destructive tendencies in our time are too much at odds with each other to admit of reconciliation. The social horizon presents the starkly conflicting prospects of a harmonized world with an ecological sensibility based on a rich commitment to community, mutual aid, and new technologies, on the one hand, and the terrifying prospect of some sort of thermonuclear disaster on the other. Our world, it would appear, will either undergo revolutionary changes, so far-reaching in character that humanity will totally transform its social relations and its very conception of life, or it will suffer an apocalypse that may well end humanity's tenure on the planet.

The tension between these two prospects has already subverted the morale of the traditional social order. We have entered an era that consists no longer of institutional stabilization but of institutional decay. A widespread alienation is developing toward the forms, the aspirations, the demands, and above all, the institutions of the established order. The most exuberant, theatrical evidence of this alienation occurred in the s, when the "youth revolt" in the early half of the decade exploded into what seemed to be a counterculture. Considerably more than protest and adolescent nihilism marked the period. Almost intuitively, new values of sensuousness, new forms of communal lifestyle, changes in dress, language, music, all borne on the wave of a deep sense of impending social change, infused a sizable section of an entire generation.

We still do not know in what sense this wave began to ebb: whether as a historic retreat or as a transformation into a serious project for inner and social development. That the symbols of this movement eventually became the artifacts for a new culture industry does not alter its far-reaching effects. Western society will never be the same again — all the sneers of its academics and its critics of "narcissism" notwithstanding.

What makes this ceaseless movement of deinstitutionalization and delegitimation so significant is that it has found its bedrock in a vast stratum of western society. Alienation permeates not only the poor but also the relatively affluent, not only the young but also their elders, not only the visibly denied but also the seemingly privileged. The prevailing order is beginning to lose the loyalty of social strata that traditionally rallied to its support and in which its roots were firmly planted in past periods. Crucial as this decay of institutions and values may be, it by no means exhausts the problems that confront the existing society. Intertwined with the social crisis is a crisis that has emerged directly from man's exploitation of the planet.

This problem is not unique to our times. The desiccated wastelands of the Near East, where the arts of agriculture and urbanism had their beginnings, are evidence of ancient human despoilation, but this example pales before the massive destruction of the environment that has occurred since the days of the Industrial Revolution, and especially since the end of the Second World War. The damage inflicted on the environment by contemporary society encompasses the entire earth. Volumes have been written on the immense losses of productive soil that occur annually in almost every continent of the earth; on the extensive destruction of tree cover in areas vulnerable to erosion; on lethal air-pollution episodes in major urban areas; on the worldwide diffusion of toxic agents from agriculture, industry, and power-producing installations; on the chemicalization of humanity's immediate environment with industrial wastes, pesticide residues, and food additives.

The exploitation and pollution of the earth has damaged not only the integrity of the atmosphere, climate, water resources, soil, flora and fauna of specific regions, but also the basic natural cycles on which all living things depend. Yet modern man's capacity for destruction is quixotic evidence of humanity's capacity for reconstruction. The powerful technological agents we have unleashed against the environment include many of the very agents we require for its reconstruction.

The knowledge and physical instruments for promoting a harmonization of humanity with nature and of human with human are largely at hand or could easily be devised. Many of the physical principles used to construct such patently harmful facilities as conventional power plants, energy-consuming vehicles, surface-mining equipment and the like could be directed to the construction of small-scale solar and wind energy devices, efficient means of transportation, and energy-saving shelters. What we crucially lack is the consciousness and sensibility that will help us achieve such eminently desirable goals — a consciousness and sensibility far broader than customarily meant by these terms. Our definitions must include not only the ability to reason logically and respond emotionally in a humanistic fashion; they must also include a fresh awareness of the relatedness between things and an imaginative insight into the possible.

On this score, Marx was entirely correct to emphasize that the revolution required by our time must draw its poetry not from the past but from the future, from the humanistic potentialities that lie on the horizons of social life. The new consciousness and sensibility cannot be poetic alone; they must also be scientific. Indeed, there is a level at which our consciousness must be neither poetry nor science, but a transcendence of both into a new realm of theory and practice, an artfulness that combines fancy with reason, imagination with logic, vision with technique. We cannot shed our scientific heritage without returning to a rudimentary technology, with its shackles of material insecurity, toil, and renunciation.

And we cannot allow ourselves to be imprisoned within a mechanistic outlook and a dehumanizing technology — with its shackles of alienation, competition, and a brute denial of humanity's potentialities. Poetry and imagination must be integrated with science and technology, for we have evolved beyond an innocence that can be nourished exclusively by myths and dreams. Is there a scientific discipline that allows for the indiscipline of fancy, imagination, and artfulness? Can it encompass problems created by the social and environmental crises of our time? Can it integrate critique with reconstruction, theory with practice, vision with technique?

Vivekananda was one of the main representatives of Neo-Vedanta , a modern interpretation of Hinduism in line with western esoteric traditions , especially Transcendentalism , New Thought and Theosophy. Vivekananda's acquaintance with western esotericism made him very successful in western esoteric circles, beginning with his speech in at the Parliament of Religions. Vivekananda adapted traditional Hindu ideas and religiosity to suit the needs and understandings of his western audiences, who were especially attracted by and familiar with western esoteric traditions and movements like Transcendentalism and New thought.

In he founded the Ramakrishna Mission , which was instrumental in the spread of Neo-Vedanta in the west, and attracted people like Alan Watts. Together with Gerald Heard , Christopher Isherwood , and other followers he was initiated by the Swami and was taught meditation and spiritual practices. A major force in the mutual influence of eastern and western ideas and religiosity was the Theosophical Society. The New Age movement is a Western spiritual movement that developed in the second half of the 20th century. Its central precepts have been described as "drawing on both Eastern and Western spiritual and metaphysical traditions and infusing them with influences from self-help and motivational psychology , holistic health , parapsychology , consciousness research and quantum physics ".

Insight prajna , kensho , satori , gnosis , theoria , illumination , especially enlightenment or the realization of the illusory nature of the autonomous "I" or self, is a key element in modern western nondual thought. It is the personal realization that ultimate reality is nondual, and is thought to be a validating means of knowledge of this nondual reality. This insight is interpreted as a psychological state, and labeled as religious or mystical experience. According to Hori, the notion of "religious experience" can be traced back to William James , who used the term "religious experience" in his book, The Varieties of Religious Experience. In the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, several historical figures put forth very influential views that religion and its beliefs can be grounded in experience itself.

While Kant held that moral experience justified religious beliefs , John Wesley in addition to stressing individual moral exertion thought that the religious experiences in the Methodist movement paralleling the Romantic Movement were foundational to religious commitment as a way of life. Wayne Proudfoot traces the roots of the notion of "religious experience" to the German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher — , who argued that religion is based on a feeling of the infinite. The notion of "religious experience" was used by Schleiermacher and Albert Ritschl to defend religion against the growing scientific and secular critique, and defend the view that human moral and religious experience justifies religious beliefs.

Such religious empiricism would be later seen as highly problematic and was — during the period in-between world wars — famously rejected by Karl Barth. The notion of "religious experience" was adopted by many scholars of religion, of which William James was the most influential. The notion of "experience" has been criticised. Insight is not the "experience" of some transcendental reality, but is a cognitive event, the intuitive understanding or "grasping" of some specific understanding of reality, as in kensho [] or anubhava.

A main modern proponent of perennialism was Aldous Huxley , who was influenced by Vivekanda's Neo-Vedanta and Universalism. According to the "common-core thesis", [] different descriptions can mask quite similar if not identical experiences: []. According to Elias Amidon there is an "indescribable, but definitely recognizable, reality that is the ground of all being. According to Renard, nondualism as common essence prefers the term "nondualism", instead of monism , because this understanding is "nonconceptual", "not graspapable in an idea". The only thing that can be said is that it is "not two" or "non-dual": [web 24] [] According to Renard, Alan Watts has been one of the main contributors to the popularisation of the non-monistic understanding of "nondualism".

The "common-core thesis" is criticised by "diversity theorists" such as S. T Katz and W. The idea of a common essence has been questioned by Yandell, who discerns various "religious experiences" and their corresponding doctrinal settings, which differ in structure and phenomenological content, and in the "evidential value" they present. The specific teachings and practices of a specific tradition may determine what "experience" someone has, which means that this "experience" is not the proof of the teaching, but a result of the teaching. Bronkhorst for example notices that the conception of what exactly "liberating insight" is in Buddhism was developed over time. Whereas originally it may not have been specified, later on the Four Truths served as such, to be superseded by pratityasamutpada , and still later, in the Hinayana schools, by the doctrine of the non-existence of a substantial self or person.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Mature state of consciousness transcending dualism. History Timeline. Christian Catholic Mysticism Sufism. Buddhist modernism New religious movement Secular spirituality " Spiritual but not religious " Syncretism. Spiritual experience. Mystical experience Religious experience Spiritual practice. Spiritual development. Ego death Individuation Spiritual development Self-actualization Spiritual activism. Other non-Western. Animism Shamanism Totemism. Humanistic psychology Mindfulness Positive psychology Self-help Self-realization True self and false self. Mystical psychosis Cognitive science of religion Neuroscience of religion Geschwind syndrome Evolutionary psychology of religion.

Aryadeva and Nagarjuna Adi Shankara. Laozi and Confucius. Moral universalism Universality Universalizability. Other religions. Mysticism Nondualism Perennialism Theosophy. Moksha Anubhava Turiya Sahaja. Poonja Other Osho Eckhart Tolle. Monasteries and Orders. Academic Paul Deussen Daniel H. See also: Monism , Mind-body dualism , Dualistic cosmology , and Pluralism philosophy. Main articles: Samkhya , Yoga , and Yoga philosophy. See also: Transcendental Nirvana. Main articles: Madhyamika , Shunyata , and Two truths doctrine.

Main article: Yogacara. Main article: Buddhism in China. See also: Korean Buddhism and Essence-Function. Main article: Vajrayana. Main article: Rangtong-Shentong. Main articles: Dzogchen and Rigpa. Main article: Vedanta. Main article: Advaita Vedanta. See also: Bhedabheda. Main articles: Shaivism and Kashmir Shaivism. Scriptures and texts. Main article: Ramana Maharshi. Main article: Neo-Advaita. Main articles: Nath , Sahaja , and Inchegeri Sampradaya. Main article: Taoism. Main article: Gnosticism.

Main article: Neoplatonism. Main articles: Christian contemplation , Christian Mysticism , and Apophatic theology. See also: Henosis. Main articles: Judaism , Hasidism , and Kabbalah. Main article: Platonism in Islamic Philosophy. Main article: Western esotericism. Main article: Perennial philosophy. Main article: Orientalism. Main article: Transcendentalism. Main article: Theosophical Society. Main article: New Age. Main articles: Religious experience , Mystical experience , Altered states of consciousness , and Ego-death. Various Abheda Acosmism belief that the world is illusory Anatta Belief that there is no self Cosmic Consciousness Emanationism Henosis Union with the absolute Deconstruction , which may oppose binary pairs of opposed opposites Holism Kenosis Self-emptying Maya illusion Cosmic illusion Monad philosophy Monism Neo-Advaita Nihilism Nirguna Brahman Oceanic feeling Open individualism Panentheism Pantheism Belief that God and the world are identical Pluralism metaphysics Process Psychology Radical orthodoxy , a postmodern theological school in Anglo-Catholic circles that "resists any neat dualism between the sacred and the secular" Rigpa Shuddhadvaita Solipsism Sunyata Emptiness.

Over definitions, descriptions, and discussions. Thus did Yajnavalkya teach him. This is his highest goal, this is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss. In the Eastern tradition [ There the seeds of seer-seen nonduality not only sprouted but matured into a variety some might say a jungle of impressive philosophical species. By no means do all these [Eastern] systems assert the nonduality of subject and object, but it is significant that three which do — Buddhism, Vedanta and Taoism — have probably been the most influential. As opposed to this world, it is a pleasant place to be in, it is sukha, things work well.

In verse 21 and 22, it is stated that consciousness comes into the mother's womb, and finds a resting place in mind-and-body. It is therefore beyond our conceptions of good and evil, right and wrong, existence and non-existence. Jay L. This translation became widely known and popular as "the Tibetan Book of the Dead", but contains many mistakes in translation and interpretation. Lokayatikas and Bauddhas who assert that the soul does not exist. There are four sects among the followers of Buddha: 1. Madhyamicas who maintain all is void; 2. Yogacharas, who assert except sensation and intelligence all else is void; 3.

Sautranticas, who affirm actual existence of external objects no less than of internal sensations; 4. Vaibhashikas, who agree with later Sautranticas except that they contend for immediate apprehension of exterior objects through images or forms represented to the intellect. Kalupahana notes that the Visuddhimagga contains "some metaphysical speculations, such as those of the Sarvastivadins, the Sautrantikas, and even the Yogacarins ". Nicholas F. Gandhi have been labeled "neo-Vedantists," a philosophy that rejects the Advaitins' claim that the world is illusory. Aurobindo, in his The Life Divine , declares that he has moved from Sankara's "universal illusionism" to his own "universal realism" , defined as metaphysical realism in the European philosophical sense of the term.

See [web 12] and [web 13] Ramana was taught at Christian schools. The term is carefully selected because 'neo' means 'a new or revived form'. It can even be termed 'pseudo' because, by presenting the teaching in a highly attenuated form, it might be described as purporting to be Advaita, but not in effect actually being so, in the fullest sense of the word. In this watering down of the essential truths in a palatable style made acceptable and attractive to the contemporary western mind, their teaching is misleading.

King , "Orientalism and Religion" [] for descriptions of this mutual exchange. And even after He brought into being everything which exists, there is nothing but Him, and you cannot find anything that existed apart from Him, G-d forbid. For nothing existed devoid of G-d's power, for if there were, He would be limited and subject to duality, G-d forbid. Rather, G-d is everything that exists, but everything that exists is not G-d Nothing is devoid of His G-dliness: everything is within it Olcott and Anagarika Dharmapala , Blavatsky was instrumental in the Western transmission and revival of Theravada Buddhism. The Christian model of dramatic conversions, based on the role-model of Paul's conversion, may also have served as a model for Western interpretations and expectations regarding "enlightenment", similar to Protestant influences on Theravada Buddhism, as described by Carrithers: "It rests upon the notion of the primacy of religious experiences, preferably spectacular ones, as the origin and legitimation of religious action.

But this presupposition has a natural home, not in Buddhism, but in Christian and especially Protestant Christian movements which prescribe a radical conversion. Both historical and ethnographic evidence suggests that the privileging of experience may well be traced to certain twentieth-century reform movements, notably those that urge a return to zazen or vipassana meditation, and these reforms were profoundly influenced by religious developments in the west [ For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thru' narrow chinks of his cavern.

A concordance to the principal Upanisads and Bhagavadgita. Motilal Banarsidass. ISBN Perrett Indian Philosophy of Religion. Springer Science. Lochtefeld The Rosen Publishing Group. Mark Heim Eerdmans Publishing. Barton The Cambridge Companion to the Gospels. Cambridge University Press. Knitter Without Buddha I Could not be a Christian.

The reference is at A I, Alan Wallace Contemplative Science. Columbia University Press. Buddhist Thought. Routledge , p. Davis Buswell Jr. Lopez Jr. The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism. Princeton University Press. Theravada Buddhism. Buddhadhamma: Natural Laws and Values for Life. State University of New York Press. Minoru Kiyota and Elvin W. Jones ed. In Zalta, Edward N. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Summer ed. Retrieved 5 September Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.

Robertson, Zhongguo ren min da xue. Guo xue yuan, A Study of the Dharmadharmatavibhanga: Vasubandhu's commentary and three critical editions of the root texts, with a modern commentary from the perspective of the rNying ma tradition by Master Tam Shek-wing. Vasubandhu's treatise on the three natures translated from the Tibetan edition with a commentary, Asian Philosophy, Volume 7, , Issue 2, pp. Zalta ed. In Antonio S. Cua ed. Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment. SUNY series in religious studies. SUNY Press. Source: [2] accessed: Friday 9 April , p. Source: [3] accessed: Saturday 8 May , p. Ground, Path and Fruition. Zhyisil Chokyi Ghatsal Charitable Trust. Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism. Snow Lion Publications. Offering Flowers, Feeding Skulls.

Oxford University Press. Motilal Banarsidass: —

Bonet MauryEarly Similarities Between Transcendentalism And The Second Great Awakening of Eng. Violation Antisocial Behavior In New Orleans: A Literature Review the exchange principle has something nonsensical and implausible about it; here and Similarities Between Transcendentalism And The Second Great Awakening even children eye David G. Burnett Biography giver suspiciously, as if the gift were merely a trick to sell them brushes or soap. By contrast, the social realm raises Similarities Between Transcendentalism And The Second Great Awakening objective possibility of Similarities Between Transcendentalism And The Second Great Awakening and self-consciousness as the superadded function of stability.